Untitled by Dietzel, Robert
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
1-1-2004
Untitled
Robert Dietzel
Michigan State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Dietzel, Untitled (2004),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/46
Robert A. Dietzel
King Scholar Paper
April 30, 2004
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq (1993).
3 1 Cranch 137(1803).
4 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq (2000).
1
I. Introduction
In 1990 the United States Supreme Court sparked the ire of scholars, civil rights activists,
religious minorities and the United States Congress when it issued its controversial decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.1  That decision has been criticized by scholars and activists from
all different perspectives who have interpreted it as severely limiting the free exercise rights of
many religious minorities.  The decision inspired Congress to pass a law, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) designed to circumvent the Supreme Court and effectively overturn the
Smith decision.2  The passage of the RFRA created a battle of the branches reminiscent of the
separation of powers debate decided by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.3  With respect
to the RFRA, the judicial branch won the battle when, in 1997, the Supreme Court declared the
RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.4
Undeterred, in 2000 Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA).5  Under the Act, Congress again attempted to undermine the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith.  However, Congress was wary of the constitutional questions posed in
6 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)
(2000).
7 See, e.g. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/15.  For a discussion of the Illinois RFRA, see Mary
Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Why RFRAs Don’t Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 153 (2000).
8 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq (2000).
9 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 1547, 108th Cong. (2003).
2
City of Boerne, and thus asserted separate constitutional grounds to justify the legislation.6 The
Supreme Court has not yet heard an RLUIPA case.  However, numerous constitutional
challenges have been brought in the district and circuit courts alleging various constitutional
violations.  Thus far, a majority of the courts deciding the issue have found the statute
constitutional, but a distinct minority of courts have ruled otherwise.
While the question of the RLUIPA’s constitutionality remains unanswered, Congress and
the state legislatures continue to consider legislation designed to limit or overturn the Supreme
Court’s law & religion jurisprudence.  In response to the Court’s decision in City of Boerne,
several state legislatures passed statutes with wording similar to or identical to the RFRA.7  In
2000, Congress amended the RFRA to eliminate its application to the states, consistent with the
Court’s ruling in City of Boerne.8
Most recently, in April of 2003, United States representative Ron Paul proposed revised
legislation in the United States House of Representatives again entitled “the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act” (RFRA II).9  Following the RFRA’s and the RLUIPA’s lead, the house bill
again attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court, and like the drafters of the RLUIPA, it is
obvious that the drafters of RFRA II were cognizant of the Court’s holding in City of Boerne,
and thus attempted to draft legislation that would not be overturned under the City of Boerne
10 Id. at §§ 3 and 4.
11 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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holding.  Unlike RFRA and RLUIPA, RFRA II is not directed at overturning the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith, but rather the concerns of the drafters run far broader.  RFRA II
proposes to circumvent a plethora of Supreme Court opinions on a variety of law & religion
issues by removing from the federal courts jurisdiction “to hear or determine any religious
freedom-related case.”10  Serious questions exist as to whether RFRA II is constitutional.
This paper will explore the background of this recent legislative desire to circumvent the
judiciary.  It will examine the majority decision in Employment Division v. Smith and show how
that controversial decision prompted the outcry that led Congress to act as it has.  Next, the paper
will examine the text of the RFRA, and through an analysis of City of Boerne v. Flores, illustrate
why the Supreme Court found the RFRA unconstitutional.  The paper will then compare the
RFRA to the text of the RLUIPA and will summarize the leading case law on the
constitutionality of the RLUIPA.  Next, the paper will compare the text of RFRA II to the two
previous statutes and will analyze, based on City of Boerne and those cases interpreting the
RLUIPA, the constitutionality of RFRA II.  The paper will show, through an analysis of these
three pieces of legislation, that Congress is constitutionally prohibited, regardless of its methods,
from legislatively overturning decisions of the Supreme Court.
II. Background
A. The Case that Started the Controversy: Employment Division v. Smith 
In Employment Division v. Smith11, the Supreme Court sharply departed from prior
12 See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the
Whole: A View from the Clergy, 18 J. L. & POL. 387, 434-35 (2002).
13 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
14 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874
15 See Id.
16 See Id.
17 See Id.
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precedent and, in fashioning a bright line rule regarding government action and individual free
exercise rights, substantially narrowed the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.  Many viewed the
Court’s decision as draconian, and groups representing all sides of the law & religion debate
criticized the Court’s holding as essentially eradicating individual free exercise rights.12  In
essence, under the Court’s holding a government is free to adopt a rule or law that substantially
interferes with, or prohibits, an individual’s personal religious practice.
Respondents in Smith, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native
American Church.13  In accordance with church practice, both Smith and Black engaged in
sacramental peyote use.14  The state of Oregon had a law making the possession of a controlled
substance a felony.  Peyote was considered a controlled substance under the law.15  Respondents’
employer, a drug rehabilitation facility, became aware of respondents’ ceremonial peyote use,
and terminated their employment.16  Respondents then applied to the state of Oregon for
unemployment benefits.  Their claim was denied because they were terminated for “work-related
‘misconduct.’”17 
Smith and Black appealed the decision of the state employment division up to the state
18 See Id. at 875.
19 See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (1986).
20 See Id.
21 See Id.
22 See Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
23 See Id.
24 See Id.
25 See Smith v. Employment Division, 763 P. 2d 146 (1988).
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supreme court.18  That court held that, although the respondents technically violated state law,
the employment division was not justified, under free exercise grounds, in denying them
unemployment benefits.19  The state supreme court relied on prior Supreme Court precedent and
applied a strict scrutiny analysis.20  The Court ultimately found that, in light of the respondents’
free exercise rights, the state did not have a compelling interest in denying them benefits.21  
In 1988, the Supreme Court first heard the case, and held that if a state is free to prohibit
a religious practice through the criminal law, it is free to impose lesser burdens, such as a denial
of benefits.22  The Court, however, determined that it was unclear under Oregon law whether the
use of peyote for religious ceremonies was illegal.23  It thereafter vacated the Oregon Supreme
Court’s decision and remanded for further consideration.24  On remand, the Oregon Supreme
Court found that, indeed, Smith and Black’s peyote use was proscribed under the statute, but
then invalidated the statute as unconstitutional.25  The Supreme Court again granted certiorari
and, in 1990, reversed.
The Court limited its decision in the case to whether the state could criminalize peyote
26 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
27 See Id. at 877-79.
28 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
30 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-85.
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use in the first instance.26  The Court based its decision on the distinction between government
compulsion or prohibition of religious beliefs versus government prohibition of religious acts,
and found that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the former, but that states are free to regulate
neutrally, with respect to the latter, so long as the law is applied to all citizens, and is not
directed at religious practices intentionally.27  In order to reach this bright line result, the Court
was forced to address its prior precedent.  
Under Sherbert v. Verner28 and its progeny, the Court developed a balancing test for
governments to use to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause required them to create a
religious exemption to otherwise generally applicable laws.  Those earlier cases required a
religious exemption if a law substantially burdened a religious practice unless the state had a
compelling interest in not granting the exemption.29  In Smith, the Court distinguished the prior
precedent.  Based on the facts of those prior cases, the Court determined that the line of cases
could be limited to the situation where the state denies unemployment benefits.30  The Court
refused to expand the Sherbert rationale to generally applicable criminal law, writing, “The
government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct,
like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the
31 Id. at 885.
32 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1927).
34 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
35 See Id.
36 See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
37 See Id.
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effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”31 The Court
was also forced to address its decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder.32  In Yoder, the Court held that the
state of Wisconsin was required to grant exemptions to its compulsory school attendance laws to
Amish families who believed that compelled school attendance, beyond the age of sixteen,
interfered with their religious practices.33  The Smith Court distinguished Yoder, and in so doing
created a new class of constitutional case.  The Court characterized Yoder and cases like it as
“hybrid” cases.34  “Hybrid” cases, according to the Court in Smith, do not rest solely on free
exercise clause grounds, but rather involve other fundamental rights.35  In Yoder, the Court relied
primarily on a parent’s right to make educational decisions for his or her child.36
After dispensing with Sherbert and Yoder, The Court held that governments need not
show a compelling reason to enforce a generally applicable law that substantially burdens an
individual’s free exercise of religion.37  Under Smith, the two exceptions to the rule would be
those cases arising out of a denial of unemployment benefits and “hybrid” cases.  The Court
pointed out that states are free to create statutory exemptions to their laws, but the state is under
38 See Id. at 890
39 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Conner, J. Concurring), and 907 (Blackmun J.,
dissenting).
40 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 895 (O’Conner, J. Concurring).
41 Id. at 903 (O’Conner, J. Concurring).
42 See Hamilton, supra note 12 at 434-35; Robert P. Drinan, Reflections on the Demise of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 86 GEO. L. J. 101, 115 (1997); Steven C. Seeger,
Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Motivation Test and the Religious Freedom Restoration
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no constitutional obligation to do so.38  By abandoning the compelling interest test from
Sherbert, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case represented a monumental shift in Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence.  
The four concurring and dissenting justices in Smith argued vociferously that the case
should have been decided under the compelling interest test.39  Those justices believed that the
compelling interest test allows courts to balance an individual’s free exercise rights against the
interests of the government in burdening those rights.40  The concurrence and the dissent
criticized the majority for misapplying precedent.  Justice O’Conner, in her concurring opinion,
wrote, “The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment’s mandate of preserving
religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.  For the Court to deem this
command a ‘luxury,’ . . . is to denigrate ‘the very purpose of a Bill of Rights.’”41 
B. The Aftermath of Smith
Like the concurring and dissenting justices, people from all sides of the law & religion
debate were outraged that the Court eliminated the compelling interest test.42  Those groups,
Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 1472 (1997).
43 See generally Shawn Jensvold, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of Congressional Power, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 5
(2001); Drinan, supra note 42 at 120.
44 See generally Drinan, supra note 42 at 120.  Drinan posits other examples, such as, “a
law protecting the rights of homosexuals that requires a church to hire a gay minister. . . an
ordinance that denies the right of a Jewish man to wear a yarmulke.”  Id.   Drinan further
discusses the ramifications of the Smith decision absent some limiting principle, such as RFRA,
stating, 
At the local level, zoning commissions will quietly deny access to Jewish
temples, controversial denominations, or Catholic schools.  Appeals will not be
taken nor will there be any public outcry.  The number of individuals who will
seek to vindicate their rights under the Smith decision will be small.  
Id. at 115-16.
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united in their advocacy for the protection of free exercise rights, were profoundly concerned
that the court’s opinion essentially provided state and federal governments carte blanche to
legislate without regard for the impact on religious practice.43  For example, under the Court’s
newly created rule, if a city passed an ordinance that made it unlawful to consume alcohol on
Sundays, Christians partaking in communion would be prohibited from consuming wine - a
practice that is central to the Christian faith.  Assuming the law was generally applicable,
Christians would have no recourse even though the city would likely not be able to demonstrate
a narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest. 44  Since Christianity is a majority religion
in most cities, it is unlikely that such a law would be passed, but like the peyote law at issue in
Smith, it is entirely likely, and in fact probable, that local and state governments may pass
generally applicable laws that have the effect of prohibiting a practice that is central to the faith
of practitioners of a minority religion - akin to the Christian sacrament of communion.  In those
45 Sixty-eight different religious and civil liberties groups sponsored the RFRA in
Congress.  See Drinan, supra note 42 at 118.
46  “The rivers of ink spilled in criticism of the decision in Employment Division v. Smith
are the stuff of which legends are made. The law review articles, the hearings in Congress, and
the numerous editorials in newspapers and magazines contributed to a Nile of print.  The
standard story was apocalyptic, with the Supreme Court - actually, Justice Scalia himself -
betraying the Free Exercise Clause and ruining religious liberty.” Hamilton, supra note 12 at
434.
47 See Drinan, supra note 42 at 118; Seeger, supra note 42 at 1472-73.
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq. (1993).
49 See Seeger, supra note 42 at 1472-73.
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
51 Upon signing the bill, president Clinton proclaimed that the RFRA “[R]everses the
Supreme Court’s decision [in] Employment Division against Smith, and reestablishes a standard
t6hat better protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of their religion in a way that I am
convinced is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders of this Nation than the Supreme
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situations, members of the minority religion would have no recourse under Smith.
This result infuriated civil rights groups, religious minority groups, and other deeply
religious members of majority religions.45  Scholars immediately began writing scathing articles
of the Smith decision.46  Groups with diverse interests lobbied Congress to enact legislation
limiting the impact of the Smith decision.47  In 1997, Congress capitulated, and with
overwhelming bipartisan support, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.48  The public
fear that individual religious liberty was being eroded by the Court was somewhat assuaged by
the passage of the legislation49.  Essentially, by demanding governments to establish a
compelling interest before burdening religion through neutral laws, the RFRA mandated the
judicial standards courts were to apply when analyzing a religious liberty case.50  The statute
overturned Smith and re-instated the compelling interest test.51  The text of the Act made it
Court decision.”  Eugene Gressman, State and Federal Religious Liberty Legislation: Is it
Necessary?  Is it Constitutional?  Is it Good Policy?  RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper
Errors, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 514.
52 Approximately 300 cases were brought under RFRA.  See Drinan, supra note 42 at
104.  An overwhelming majority of those plaintiffs did not prevail.  See Id.
53 See Id.
54 For an interesting examination of the legislative history, see Gressman, supra note 51
at 515.
55 See Id.
56 See Id.
57 See Id.
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specifically applicable to the states. Subsequently, courts followed the mandates of the RFRA
and again began to analyze religious liberty claims under the compelling interest test.52
C. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Congress’s First Attempt to
Overturn the Supreme Court
The RFRA was passed by both houses of Congress with virtually no challenge.53  The
legislative history shows a general distaste for the Smith decision and a generalized fear that the
decision would erode religious liberty.54  However, members of Congress did not point to any
specific religious rights that they feared would be eroded under Smith.55  Congress’s primary
motivation, it appears, was to overturn the Smith decision.56  Whether this desire was motivated
by true and articulated fears of religious oppression, or whether the motivation was purely
reactionary - a response to an unpopular, but perhaps innocuous Court decision, is
questionable.57
The text of the RFRA contains specific congressional findings.  These findings include:
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1993)
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993)
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993)
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(2) laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith . . . the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.58
The RFRA also contains a section listing the ‘purposes’ of the Act.  Here, the Congress
stated that its purpose was: 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert . . . and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.59
 It is clear from the text that Congress intended, by passing the RFRA, to specifically overturn
the Court’s decision in Smith.
The substantive portion of the statute is remarkably short.  It provides one general,
overriding principle, and one exception to that principle.  The primary principle states,
“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”60 Under the exception, government may
substantially burden a person’s religious exercise if it can show that the burden “(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (1993)
64 Id. This text was amended in 2000 in light of the City of Boerne Decision.  The text “a
State, or a subdivision of a State” was replaced with the text “a covered entity.”  “Covered
entity” was then defined as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and each territory and
possession of the United States, thus all application to the states was deleted from the text of the
Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2003).
65 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (1993) Again, the reference to state law was stricken in the 2000
amendments.
66 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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furthering that compelling governmental interest.”61  In other words, Congress re-instated the
balancing test articulated under Sherbert.  RFRA also provides that, where applicable, a person
can assert his or her rights under the statute as a claim or defense against a government, and can
obtain appropriate relief from that government.62
Congress made the statute specifically applicable to state and local governments.63  The
definition of government specifically included “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality,
and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, or of a State, or a
subdivision of a State.”64  Further, the Act stated, “This chapter applies to all Federal and State
law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise. . . .”65    In City of
Boerne v. Flores66, Congress’s authority to dictate judicial standards to state courts and state
governments was questioned.  While the holding in City of Boerne may technically be limited to
the RFRA’s application to the states, its rationale is more far reaching.
D. City of Boerne v. Flores: The Supreme Court Trumps Congress on Questions
of Constitutional Interpretation
67 Id.
68 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
69 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.  These facts provide an excelling example of how
the RFRA was designed to be implemented.
70  See Id.
71 14th Amendment, Article 5 states, “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.
72  See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
73 See Id. at 512-13.
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In City of Boerne v. Flores67, the Supreme Court held that RFRA’s application to the
states was unconstitutional.68  In City of Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio applied to the
city of San Antonio’s Historic Landmark Commission for a permit to enlarge St. Peter Catholic
Church, a building which was identified as historic, and which thus fell under the purview of the
Commission.69  The Commission denied the application, and the Archbishop sued the
Commission under the RFRA, claiming the Commission did not have a compelling
governmental interest in denying his request and that the denial was not narrowly tailored as was
required under the RFRA.70  The District Court held that the RFRA was an unconstitutional
application of Congress’s power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.71  The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, and found the RFRA constitutional.72  
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court was forced to grapple with foundational
constitutional questions relating to the separation of powers and federalism.  The Court began its
analysis by examining the text and legislative history of the RFRA and concluded that by
enacting the RFRA Congress clearly intended to circumvent the Court’s decision in Smith.73  The
74 See Id. at 516.
75 See Id.
76 U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.  Congress has the authority to force legislation upon the
states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to remedy constitutional violations. 
Here, Congress intended to circumvent state action that would limit religious freedom.  In other
words, In the mind of Congress, the Smith decision revoked constitutional protection from those
desiring to practice their religions, and thus Congress, under its authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, enacted legislation to reinstate those constitutional protections. 
77 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18.
78 See Id. at 518.
79 See Id. at 530.
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Court then addressed the question of whether Congress has the constitutional authority to
overturn a decision of the Supreme Court on the basis of constitutional interpretation.74  The
Court determined, based on the House and Senate reports, that the framers of RFRA, in enacting
the legislation, relied upon their powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.75  Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress the power to enact necessary laws to enforce the
provisions of the Article.76 
The Court acknowledged Congress’s power under section 5 to remediate perceived
constitutional wrongs through legislation, even legislation that forced states to comply.77 
However, according to the Court, Congress’s power is not limitless.78  In order for congressional
dictates under section 5 to apply to the states, Congress is required to show a clear history of
constitutional violations by the states, and must show that legislative remediation is necessary to
remedy an existing and pervasive wrong.79  Under the RFRA, according to the Court, the
legislative history gave no indication of severe or pervasive violations of free exercise rights
80 See Id.
81 See Id. at 519-20.
82 Id. at 520..
83 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
84 See Id. at 520-24.
85 See Id.
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where states have adopted neutral laws.80
Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court
distinguished Congress’s actions in passing the RFRA as going beyond enforcement.81 
Congress’s power is limited to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment as defined and interpreted
by the Supreme Court.  One basis for determining whether Congress is enforcing, as opposed to
defining, according to the Court, is whether “there [is] congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”82  Again, the Court
concluded that the RFRA’s legislative history did not point to any substantial constitutional
deprivation of individual rights by the states..  Thus the broad legislation adopted by Congress
exceeded Congress’s enforcement powers.83  The legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided further support for the Court’s decision that Congress’s power to legislate
regarding the terms of the amendments must be narrowly construed in order to prevent Congress
from usurping the power of state legislatures.84  The Court also relied upon the legislative history
of the Fourteenth Amendment expressing congressional concern that a broader grant of power to
the Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment would erode the foundations of the separation of
powers doctrine.85  The Court then examined its precedent to show that its interpretation of
86 See Id. at 525-29.
87 Id. at 536.
88 Id. at 532.
89 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
90 See Id.
91 See Id. at 535-36.
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Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment was supported by prior case law.86
The Court applied its interpretation of Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and held that the application of the RFRA to the states was
unconstitutional.  The Court cited the glaring lack of any record in RFRA’s legislative history of
profound denials of protected rights.87  As such, Congress had no reason to remediate, and thus
acted outside its constitutionally authorized authority.  The Court wrote,
RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to
have any meaning.  RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.  It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive
change in constitutional protections.88
The Court criticized the scope of RFRA’s reach, stating that Congress should limit its remedial
legislation to focus on those instances and situations of specific constitutional violation.89 
RFRA, on the other hand, applied to every government official or body, both federal and state, at
all levels of government.90  
In conclusion, the Court made broader pronouncements, beyond the text of Section 5,
regarding congressional authority to interpret the Constitution via legislation.91  The Court
92 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
93 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 535-36.
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quoted famous language from Marbury v. Madison92 in concluding that Congress may not
legislate on the substance of constitutional issues.93  The Court, relying on Chief Justice
Marshall’s decision in Marbury wrote,
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means.’ It would be ‘on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. . . .’ Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and
effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in
Article V.94 
After concluding that the application of RFRA to the states violated the Constitution, the Court
admonished Congress to refrain from violating the principles of the separation of powers,
writing, 
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each
part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches.  When the Court has interpreted the
Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is. . . .  When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles. . . .  RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies,
such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked
are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which
must control. . . .  RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance.95
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2000).
97 See Gressman, supra note 51 at 529-30.
98 See Id.
99 See Id.
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The Court’s recognition that the judicial branch, not the legislative branch, was given the
authority under the Constitution to hear and determine cases and controversies, along with the
Court’s concern regarding the principles of separation of powers and federalism make the
application of this case far broader in scope than the actual holding.  
Even after the City of Boerne case the RFRA remains the law, at least with respect to the
federal government.  RFRA was amended in 2000 and application to the states was removed.96 
After the Court’s broad decision in City of Boerne, however, the RFRA’s overall
constitutionality is questionable. Further, Congress failed to adhere to the Court’s admonition,
and immediately began work on legislation that would accomplish the same result as the RFRA
through what it hoped would be constitutional means.97
E. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Congress Strikes
Back
Shortly after the Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, the House of
Representatives attempted to re-work the RFRA, under the title “Religious Liberty Protection
Act” (RLPA).98  The bill had the same ends as the RFRA.  However, Congress attempted to
circumvent the City of Boerne holding by deriving its authority from Congress’s Article II
powers, rather than Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; namely the Commerce Clause and
the Spending Clause.99  The bill was passed in the House of Representatives in 1999, but
100 See Stanton K. Oishi, RFRA II: The Failure of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 U.
HAW. L. REV. 131, 138 (2002).
101 See Gressman, supra note 51 at 529-30.
102 See Id.
103 See Oishi, supra note 100 at 138.
104 See Marci Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L. J. 311, 333-34 (2003).
105 See Id.
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ultimately died in the Senate.  RLUIPA, a much narrower compromise bill was passed by both
houses in 2000.100
The House of Representatives, in debating the RLPA, attempted to overcome RFRA’s
constitutional deficiencies.  First, Congress based its authority on Commerce Clause and
Spending Clause powers, rather than Section 5 powers.101  Next, Congress attempted to comply
with the Court’s reasoning in City of Boerne that in order for federal legislation to be controlling
on the states, Congress was required to create a record and illustrate how their powers, either
under section 5 or under the Commerce or Spending clauses, could be invoked.102  The RLPA
did not pass in the Senate.103  However, strong lobbying groups interested in preserving and
protecting religious liberty from land use and zoning boards and prison officials, succeeded in
getting a narrower version of the RLPA, related specifically to those two areas of concern,
passed by both houses.104  There is next to no independent legislative history on the RLUIPA
because it was truly an offshoot of the RLPA.105  However, the legislative history of the RLPA
contains a record showing examples of instances where free exercise rights were allegedly
106 The scope of this legislative history has been disputed.  Some argue that it is enough to
satisfy the City of Boerne mandate that Congress demonstrate widespread systemic constitutional
violations, while others believe the record fails to illustrate a valid concern to invoke Congress’s
power to legislate state activity.  See David B. Zocco, Supersized with Fries: Regulating
Religious Land Use in the Megachurches, 88 MINN. L. REV. 416, 433 (2003).  But see,
Gressman, supra note 51 at 529-30.
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
108 See Id.
109 See Id.
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).
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violated by state and local land use boards and prison officials.106
The text of the RLUIPA is substantially similar to the text of the RFRA, except the
RLUIPA draws a much narrower scope and explicitly states the basis of congressional
authority.107  Like RFRA, the RLUIPA sets forth single principles of law to govern government
conduct with respect to infringement of religious liberty, and contains a single exception to the
general principle.108  However, unlike the RFRA, which covered all religious practice, the
RLUIPA’s coverage is limited to land use and institutionalized persons cases.109  The land use
provisions of the RLUIPA state, 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution -
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.110
The institutionalized persons provision states, 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution. . . even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person -
111  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
112  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2) & cc-1(b).
113  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(c). (Thus invoking its powers under the Spending Clause
and the Commerce Clause.).
114 See Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamoreneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d. 230, 234-35
(S.D. NY, 2003) (analyzing RLUIPA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
115  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4).
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(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.111
Congress made both provisions applicable to any program or activity that receives federal
funding or any program or activity affecting commerce.112  In addition, the provisions relating to
land use provide that the statute applies to any governmental subdivision that makes
“individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.”113  Presumably,
Congress derived its authority to enact this provision from its Fourteenth Amendment section 5
powers.114  The text of the RLUIPA specifically indicates that the statute applies to state and
local governments.115
In effect, the RLUIPA would overturn the Court’s Smith decision in cases alleging a
substantial burden on free exercise rights in land use decisions and prisoner’s rights cases.  Read
literally, and assuming it is constitutional, its application would likely have led to a victory for
the Catholic church in the underlying factual case in  City of Boerne.  If, in that case, the Court
determined that the Catholic church was “substantially burdened” by the committees’s decision
to deny its application for expansion, then the RLUIPA would require the city to prove that it
had a compelling interest in denying the application and that the process by which the
116 See Kokinov v. Orange County, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla., 2004) (zoning
provision banning use of land for religious organization did not violate the RLUIPA because
there was no substantial burden), Murphy v. Zoning Comm’n, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87, 113 (D.
Conn., 2003) (Cease and desist order from town’s zoning commission prohibiting prayer group
meeting substantially burdened religion.), Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 949-50
(W.D. Wisc., 2002) (Prison policy that denied Muslim prisoner access to cleansing oils was a
substantial burden on his religion.).
117 See Id.
23
application was denied was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest.  Similarly, under
the institutionalized persons provisions of the RLUIPA, where a prisoner’s request to where a
garment or accessory required by his religion, a yarmulke for example, is denied, and the
prisoner is able to show that such a denial amounts to a substantial burden on his religion, the
state would be required to show that it has a compelling interest in denying the prisoner’s request
to wear the yarmulke, and that the denial is narrowly tailored to serve any such compelling
interest.  In other words, the RLUIPA would, in the context of land use and prisoner cases,
reinstate the pre-Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause articulated in Sherbert and its
progeny.
F. Is the RLUIPA Constitutional: A review of existing case law
Several district courts have applied the RLUIPA to cases similar to those just mentioned,
with varying results.116  Depending on how those court defined “substantial burden” many local
zoning decisions and decisions of prison officials have been overturned under the RLUIPA117
because the government could not prove a compelling interest in burdening the person’s free
exercise rights.  The district courts have also been divided over whether the RLUIPA is
118 See U.S. v. Maui County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Hawaii, 2003) (Finding the
RLUIPA constitutional).  But see, Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va., 2003)
(Finding the RLUIPA unconstitutional) (Reversed by Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.
2003)).
119 See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (Arguments were made
that the RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and
the principle of separation of powers).
120 314 F. 3d 1062 (9th Cir., 2002).
121 See Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1066.
122 See Id.
123 See Id.
124 See Id. at 1066-67.
125 See Id. at 1068.
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constitutional.118  Multiple arguments have been made, many of which are similar to the
arguments relied upon by the Court in City of Boerne, against the constitutionality of the
statute.119  At present, four federal circuit courts have addressed the RLUIPA’s constitutionality. 
Three have found the statute constitutional.120  
In Mayweathers v. Newland121, a group of Muslim prisoners sued officials of the
California Prison Systems under the RLUIPA alleging that prison rules prohibited them from
attending a Friday afternoon religious service, the Jumu’ah, in violation of their free exercise
rights.122  The state of California challenged the constitutionality of the RLUIPA on a number of
grounds.123  The Ninth Circuit first determined that Congress was authorized, under its Spending
Clause powers, to enact the legislation and make it applicable to the states.124  Next, the Court
entertained several arguments made by the state that the statute was unconstitutional on other
grounds.125  The Court systematically dismissed all of the state’s arguments.  First, the state
126 Id.
127 “A statute will survive an Establishment Clause attack if (1) it has a secular legislative
purpose, (2) the primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion.”  Mayweathers, 314 F. 3d at 1068, quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
128 See Mayweathers, 314 F. 3d at 1068-69.
129 See Id. at 1069-70.
130 See Id. (The Tenth and Eleventh Amendment arguments are beyond the scope of this
paper).
131 See Id. at 1070.
132 See Id.
133 See Id.
134 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
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argued that the RLUIPA was a violation of the Establishment Clause as a law “respecting the
establishment of religion.”126  The Court applied the Lemon127 test and determined that the
protection of religious liberty is a secular purpose, that the primary effects of the statute neither
advance nor inhibit religion, and that there is no excessive entanglement between the
government and religion.128  The state next argued violations of the Tenth and Eleventh
amendments.129  The Court, however, found no such violations.130  Finally, the state argued that
the RLUIPA was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.131  The Court admitted that
the RLUIPA was drafted in response to the Court’s decision in Smith.132  However, the Court
determined that the standards set forth in Smith were simply constitutional minimums, and that
the legislature was free to expand the scope of protection under the Free Exercise Clause.133
In Charles v. Verhagen134, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
135 Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
136 See Charles, 348 F.3d at 604-05.
137 The policies identified seven “umbrella” religions (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
Buddhist, Muslim, Native American, and Wiccan).  See Id. at 605.
138 See Id. at 607-09.
139 See Id. at 609-10.
140 See Id. at 610-11.
141 Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1070.
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constitutionality of the RLUIPA.135  The Court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Mayweathers, and reached a virtually identical result.  In this case, a Muslim prisoner sued the
state Department of Corrections under the RLUIPA for its refusal to allow him to possess
cleansing oils necessary for ritual prayer.136  Prison regulations listed specific religious items that
members of each “umbrella” religion could possess.137  Under the regulations for the Muslim
religion, cleansing oils were not listed.  The Court found that the RLUIPA was a valid exercise
of Congress’s Spending Clause power.138  The Court rejected the state’s arguments that the
RLUIPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh amendments and the Establishment Clause.139  Like in
Mayweathers, the Court applied the Lemon test and determined that the effects of the statute did
not advance or inhibit religion, but rather sought to ensure individual liberty.140  The Court did
not address the separation of powers argument. 
 Amazingly, neither court addressed the City of Boerne Case. In fact, in Mayweathers,
the Court wrote, “RLUIPA does not erroneously review or revise a specific ruling of the
Supreme Court because the statute does not overturn the Court’s constitutional interpretation in
Smith.”141  With that, the Court dismissed the separation of powers argument.  In City of Boerne,
142 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36.
143  See Id.
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc & 2000cc-1 (2000).
145 See generally, Gressman, supra note 51 at 517-19.
146 355 F. 3d 310 (2003).
147 See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313-14 (4th Cir. 2003).
148 See Madison, 355 F.3d at 322.
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the Court held language almost identical to the RLUIPA unconstitutional, in part because of a
violation of the separation of powers.142  In that case, the Court stressed that it was the judiciary’s
role to define the scope of the Constitution.143  Regardless of what authority Congress relies
upon, it invades the province of the judiciary when it legislates on matters of constitutional
interpretation, and then makes its interpretation of the Constitution binding on the States.  Under
the RLUIPA, Congress has set forth criteria courts must use to determine specific cases and
controversies brought under the Constitution144.  Such practice clearly usurps the role of the
judiciary.145  It is amazing that the Court in Mayweathers provided such a cursory discussion of
the issue and that both Mayweathers and Charles completely failed to distinguish the City of
Boerne case.
In Madison v. Riter146, a man sued state prison officials under the RLUIPA claiming that
their denial of his request for a kosher menu violated the RLUIPA.147 The Fourth Circuit,
limiting its analysis solely to the Establishment Clause, reversed the decision of the district court
and found that the RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause.148  The Court noted that the
RLUIPA was not designed to advance or discourage religion, but was rather a congressional
attempt to “lift[] government burdens on religious exercise and thereby facilate[] free exercise of
149 Id. at 318
150 See Id. at 318-19.
151 Id. at 319.
152 Id. at 314.
153 Id. at 322.
154 See Madison, 355 F.3d at 322.
155 349 F.3d 257 (2003).
156 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
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religion for those who wish to practice their faiths.”149  The Court dismissed the reasoning of the
district court that the RLUIPA exalts religious rights above other fundamental rights.150  In
response, the Court stated, “no provision of the Constitution even suggests that Congress cannot
single out fundamental rights for additional protection.”151  Interestingly, the Court characterized
the RLUIPA as Congress’s attempt to “conform to the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Employment Division v. Smith, and City of Boerne v. Flores [citations omitted],” when in fact, it
is clear that Congress actually attempted to circumvent those decisions.152  In analyzing the
Establishment Clause argument, the Court relied heavily on prior Supreme Court precedent
authorizing legislatures to accommodate religion without violating the Establishment Clause.  In
conclusion, the Court wrote, “legislative bodies have every right to accommodate free exercise,
so long as government does not privilege any faith, belief, or religious viewpoint in
particular.”153  The Court remanded other issues of constitutionality, such as Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment claims to the District Court.154  
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and in Cutter v.
Wilkinson155, held that the RLUIPA was unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds.156 
157 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263-64.
158 See Id.
159 See Id. at 264, relying on Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (19XX) (O’Conner, J.,
concurring).
160 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 267.
161 See Id. at 265.
162 The Court quoted an example given by the district Court in Madison.  See Id. at 265.
In the example, the Court assumes two equally situated prisoners, one who is politically
affiliated with the Aryan Nation and the other who is affiliated with a religious anti-semitic
organization.  In both cases prison officials confiscate white supremacist literature from the
prisoners.  The district court details the problems associated with the RLUIPA, writing,
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The Court noted that the RLUIPA was not a legitimate response to a real constitutional problem,
when, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, the Constitution does not require a
strict scrutiny analysis in religious freedom cases.157  As such, according to the Court, Congress
had no basis for enacting a law interpreting the Constitution where there were no provable
widespread constitutional violations.158    Like in the other cases, the Court analyzed the issue
under the Lemon test.  When examining the effects prong of the test, however, the Court based
its decision on the endorsement test articulated in prior Supreme Court precedent.159  Applying
the Endorsement Test, the Court found that a reasonable observer would believe the RLUIPA
was an endorsement of religion and that it had the impermissible effect of advancing religion.160 
The Court noted that Congress had no proof that individual religious rights were at a greater risk
of being deprived than other fundamental constitutional rights.161  The effect of the RLUIPA,
therefore, was to advance and encourage religion by providing those with religious convictions
more freedom and by encouraging those without strong religious convictions to feign such
conviction to accrue the additional benefits awarded under the RLUIPA.162  Further, according to
 “[t]he non-religious inmate may challenge the confiscation as a violation of his
rights to free expression and free association.  A court would evaluate these
claims under the deferential rational relationship test . . ., placing a high burden of
proof on the inmate and leaving the inmate with correspondingly dim prospects of
success.  However, the religious inmate, as a member of [a religious sect], may
assert a RLUIPA claim, arguing that the confiscation places substantial burden on
his religious exercise.  The religious white supremacist now has a much better
chance of success than the non-religious white supremacist, as prison officials
bear the burden of proving that the prison policy satisfies a compelling interest
and is the least restrictive means of satisfying the interest.”  The Court then points
out the obvious problem, “non-religious prisoners will know what they have to do
so that they, too, can benefit from the softer rules: become religious.” 
Madison, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
163 Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265.
164 The Court, again quoting the district court decision in Madison, detailed the incredible
shift in practice the RLUIPA created by changing the standard of constitutional review from
rational basis to strict scrutiny.  See Id. at 265. The strict scrutiny standard “requir[es] prison
officials, rather than the inmate, to bear the burden of proof that the regulation furthers a
compelling penological interest and is the least restrict means of satisfying this interest. . . .  As
is well known from the history of constitutional law, the change that RLUIPA imposes is
revolutionary, switching from a scheme of deference to one of presumptive unconstitutionality. 
Madison, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 575.
165 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 266.  “When Congress acts to lift the limitations on one right
while ignoring all others, it abandons neutrality towards these rights, placing its power behind
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the Court, the RLUIPA was unnecessary because prisoners already had a remedy and a forum for
the adjudication of free exercise rights claims prior to the adoption of the RLUIPA.163  If the
prisoner could prove that the prison official’s actions were neither reasonable or neutral, then the
rule would be held unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.164  By providing religious
prisoners who feel their fundamental rights have been violated a stronger standard of review than
other prisoners whose rights are equally violated, but for reasons that are not religious, according
to the Court, the RLUIPA advances religion, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Smith that strict scrutiny is not constitutionally required.165  The Court did not address other
one system of belief. When the one system of belief protected is religious belief, Congress has
violated the basic requirement of neutrality embodied in the Establishment Clause.” Madison,
240 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
166 See generally, Gressman, supra note 51; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36.
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constitutional questions in its decision.
The question left unanswered in these cases is whether Congress has the authority to
overturn the Supreme Court and make its interpretation binding on the states.  The issue remains
whether Congress violates the concept of separation of powers when it attempts to legislate on
matters of constitutional interpretation, and forces state and local agencies to abide by its more
stringent constitutional standards.  The courts may be correct that the RLUIPA does not violate
the Establishment Clause, but Congress’s actions likely violate the principles of the separation of
powers because, in trying to overturn the Supreme Court, Congress usurps the judiciary’s power
of constitutional interpretation in conflicts involving constitutional questions.166  Further analysis
of the constitutionality of the RLUIPA is beyond the scope of this paper.  The concepts
articulated by the various courts will be helpful, however, in analyzing Congress’s next attempt
to legislate around Supreme Court law & religion precedent.
G. Congress’s Next Attempt to Overturn the Supreme Court: RFRA II
Perhaps sensing the trend among circuit courts to uphold Congress’s attempts to overturn
Supreme Court precedent, at least some members of the House of Representatives are attempting
to enact new legislation that would re-interpret and re-define the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, and which would have sweeping consequences to current Supreme Court
interpretations of the religion clauses.  In what is again titled the Religious Freedom Restoration
167 H.R. 1547, 108th Cong. (2003). 
168 The Senate has a similar bill pending.  Senate Bill 1558, entitled the Religious
Liberties Restoration Act, was introduced by Senator Wayne Allard.  The text of the bill is
similar to that of the RLPA II.  However, the Senate bill explicitly states that Congress will
derive its power to enact the legislation from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article
III, section 2 of the Constitution.  The Senate bill would protect displays of the Ten
Commandments; the word “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance; and the motto “In God We Trust”
as specific questions preserved by the Constitution to the discretion of the individual states.  As
such, the bill would remove such questions from the jurisdiction of the federal courts inferior to
the Supreme Courts. S. 1558, 108th Cong. §2 (7) & (8).
169 H.R. 1547 § 2.
170 Id. at §2(4).
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Act (RFRA II)167, Representative Ron Paul has proposed a bill that would undercut a wide
variety of Supreme Court cases and would wrest jurisdiction over religious freedom-related
cases from the federal district courts completely168.  The bill lists extensive congressional
findings of misinterpretations of the Constitution by the federal courts.  The findings condemn
the Court’s separationist history as being antithetical to the true meaning of the Constitution.169 
The Bill states, 
The Court invented the distorted meaning of the first amendment utilizing the
separation of ‘church and state’ in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education when it
announced: The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. 
That wall must be kept high and impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest
breach. [citation omitted].  Over the past five decades, rulings of the United States
Supreme Court have served to infringe upon the rights of Americans to enjoy
freedom of speech relating to religious matters.  Such infringements include the
outlawing of prayer in schools and of the display of the Ten Commandments in
public places.  These rulings have not reflected a neutrality toward religious
denominations but a hostility toward religious thought.  They have served to
undermine the foundation of not only our moral code but our system of law and
justice.170
These harsh words aimed at the Court continue.  The drafters of the bill accuse the Court
171 Id. at §2(5).
172 Id.
173 See Id.
174 Id.
175 H.R. 1547 § 2(5)-(22).
176 Id. at § 2(22).
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of “ignor[ing] historical precedent. . ., the wording of the First Amendment, and the intent of its
framers.”171  The drafters state, “it is incumbent upon this Congress to review not only the rulings
of the Court which are in question but the wording and history of the First Amendment to
determine the intent of its framers.”172  The drafters then list several specific areas in which the
Court has decided cases, complete with references to Supreme Court decisions, that they believe
are inconsistent with the Constitution.  These areas center around the issues of school prayer and
freedom of speech, and Ten Commandments displays.173  The drafters accuse the Court of
breaching their duty to maintain the separation of powers because they believe the Court’s
decisions have been “de facto legislation or Constitution-amending.”174  The drafters then engage
in their own review of the historical underpinnings of the religion clauses, concluding that the
Court has consistently misinterpreted the clauses over the past fifty years.175  The drafters
conclude their findings by stating, 
Because the Court does not seem to be disposed to correct this egregious error, it
is incumbent upon the Congress of the United States to perform its duty to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States, by the use of its
authority to apply checks and balances to other branches of the government, when
usurpations and the exercise of excesses of power are evident.  The Congress
must, then, take the appropriate steps to correct egregious problem [sic].176
In remedying what it perceived to be “egregious problems” with the Court’s school
177 See Id. at §§ 3 & 4.
178 See Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at §§ 3(a) & 4(a).
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prayer and Ten Commandments cases, the drafters propose a seemingly simple solution: take
away the court’s power to hear such cases. 177 The bill would have Congress amend the Judiciary
Act to remove “religious freedom-related cases from federal district court jurisdiction,” and from
federal claims court jurisdiction.178  In substance, the drafters propose “The district courts of the
United States, . . . [and the United States Court of Federal Claims] shall not have jurisdiction to
hear or determine any religious freedom-related cases.”179  The drafters define “religious
freedom-related case” as “any action in which any requirement, prohibition, or other provision
relating to religious freedom that is contained in a State or Federal Statute is at issue.”180 If
RFRA II passes Congress, which is probably unlikely, the Courts should strike it down as an
unconstitutional violation of the principle of the separation of powers and as a violation of both
the Establishment Clause and of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This most recent
attack by Congress on the Supreme Court, if allowed to stand, will seriously undermine the
principles of checks and balances upon which the country was founded.
III. Analysis - Is the RFRA II Constitutional?
In analyzing the constitutionality of federal legislation, the first question to be addressed
181 Under Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) Congress may act under any of its
enumerated powers, or through the necessary and proper clause to effectuate any of its
enumerated powers.
182 See generally, Marbury, 1 Cranch 137.
183 4 Wheat 316 (1819).
184 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819).  The Court goes on to state,
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the Constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should such a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of
the land. [emphasis added].
Id. at 423.
185 See Gressman, supra note 51 at 520-21.
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is from where has Congress derived its authority to legislate.181 Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Congress is empowered to legislate on any of the enumerated powers granted to it by the
other provisions of Article II, and on any other matters necessary to implement the
Constitution.182  In M’Culloch v. Maryland183, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, set
forth a three prong test to determine whether Congress was acting within the scope of its
necessary and proper clause powers.  “[1] Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, [2] and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
[and] [3] which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.”184  The same standards have been used to determine the appropriate scope of
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.185 
Important questions of federalism are implicated when Congress attempts to dictate the
186 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
187 See Marbury, 1 Cranch at 176-77, M’Culloch, 4 Wheat at 421-23.
188 Although there is no explicit mention in H.R. 1547 as to where Congress would derive
its authority in the RFRA II, the drafters of the Senate version explicitly state that they have the
power to legislate on this subject under these two constitutional provisions. S. 1558, 108th Cong.
§2(7) & (8).
189 It is limited by the rationale articulated in Marbury and M’Culloch - that is it must not
violate any other constitutional provision.  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is further
limited by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne.
190 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
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activities of the states.  Such questions led the Supreme Court to overturn the RFRA and created
serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the RLUIPA.186  However, under RFRA II,
Congress is not attempting to limit or control state activity, but rather, the opposite is true.  The
effect of RFRA II would be to protect the decisions of state legislatures from being deemed
unconstitutional by the federal courts.  RFRA II, therefore, avoids the serious questions of
federalism that guided the Court’s decision in City of Boerne.  However, Congress must still
have a constitutional basis for legislating and the legislation must not violate any other
provisions of the Constitution.187  
It appears that the drafters of RFRA II believe that Congress is authorized to legislate
based on its powers under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.188  Congress’s powers under these provisions are not unlimited.189  As
the Court in City of Boerne pointed out, Congress must establish a compelling record of some
evil or ill being remediated in order to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.190 
It is unlikely that Congress will be able to show such a record where the states have complied
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.  Under Article III, Section 2,
191 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
192 See H.R. 1547 §§ 3 & 4.
193 See generally, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. (Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is an affirmative grant of authority to Congress to legislate on constitutional issues.).
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Congress has the power to create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.  Once Congress
creates the lower courts, it is not authorized to limit their jurisdiction with respect to questions of
constitutional interpretation if its intent is to circumvent the Supreme Court and discriminate
against non-believers and religious minorities.  Such a result violates the principle of separation
of powers and the Establishment Clause.191  The RFRA II raises serious constitutional concerns. 
Under the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Cutter, it is likely that the RFRA II is a violation of the
Establishment Clause.  Further, under the Court’s reasoning in City of Boerne, it is likely that the
RFRA II is a violation of the principles of separation of powers.
A. Is Congress constitutionally authorized to enact the RFRA II?
1. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
The effects of the RFRA II would be to make state and local governments immune from
federal constitutional inquiry relating to certain religious decision-making.  In order to provide
the states with this immunity, the drafters of the RFRA II propose to eliminate such questions
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.192 Congress may be authorized to legislate on this
subject based on their power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, which makes
the religion (and other) clauses applicable to the states.193  In other words, the drafters believe the
courts have misinterpreted the religion clauses, and thus, under Congress’s enforcement powers,
the RFRA II will shield the states from these inaccurate interpretations of the Constitution by
removing such questions from the purview of the federal courts.  
194 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
195 See H.R. 1547 § 2.
196 See Id.
197 Congress’s role is to enforce, not define the Constitution.  See City of Boerne, 526
U.S. at 519-20.
198 See M’Culloch, 4 Wheat at 423, Marbury, 1 Cranch at 178.
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As the Court in City of Boerne pointed out, however, Congress may not legislate under
its Section 5 powers unless it has shown some pervasive constitutional violation.194  Since the
RFRA II is in the early stages of congressional debate, there is no record indicating pervasive
constitutional violations other than the assertions made by the drafters in their “findings”
section.195  This section is mere rhetoric.  The drafters chastise the Court for misinterpreting the
Constitution and violating individual free speech and free exercise rights.  The drafters provide
their own interpretation of what the Constitution requires, based on their own review of the
history of the religion clauses.  The drafters then point to specific Supreme Court cases that they
believe deprive individuals of their religious liberty.196
The RFRA II faces the same problems as RFRA.  Congress does not have the authority,
under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret the Constitution. 197
Rather, constitutional interpretation is left solely to the judiciary.198  In the cases cited by the
drafters, the Supreme Court determined what the constitution requires.  It is impossible,
therefore, for Congress to attempt to overturn Supreme Court precedent under its enforcement
clause powers.  Those powers are limited to enforcing the Constitution - that is enforcing what
the Supreme Court determines the Constitution to mean.  Further, it would be impossible for the
drafters to show pervasive constitutional violations when, the examples that they give, were all
199 See Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85 (1868) (Congress has the power to define the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2), Bruner v. U.S., 343 U.S. 112 (1957).
200 See Id.
201 4 Wheat at 421-23.
202 See Marbury, 1 Cranch at 176-77, M’Culloch, 4 Wheat at 421-23.   Proponents of
removing constitutional questions over controversial issues from the federal courts hope to direct
the cases to the state courts who, they believe, will be more sympathetic to the decisions of state
and local governments.  This purpose may itself implicate due process concerns.  If Congress is
attempting to channel cases into non-neutral tribunals, those parties arguing for unpopular rights
will be denied true due process of law.  
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determined constitutional by the Supreme Court.
B. Article III, section 2
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Article III, section 2 grants Congress the
authority to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts.199  In many instances, the Court has
upheld legislation that removes or limits the federal court’s jurisdiction over certain subjects.200 
However, a more complex question is raised when Congress removes jurisdiction over
constitutional interpretation because Congress is unsatisfied with judicial interpretations of the
Constitution.  Congress’s authority to legislate on matters limiting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts must not conflict with other constitutional provisions, as Justice Marshal made clear
McCulloch v. Maryland.201 
Congress may only act according to its enumerated powers when it does not violate any
other provision of the Constitution.202  Where Congress clearly attempts to legislate away the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, separation of powers issues are clearly
implicated.  Congress is not free to remove jurisdiction from the federal courts for the articulated
203 While removal of jurisdiction from the federal courts, in and of itself, does not violate
separation of powers principles, the admitted intent of the drafters, along with their stated
findings, make clear that the drafters are attempting to undermine the Supreme Court.  Justice
Marshall, in M’Culloch, cautioned Congress against passing legislation when the true intent is to
undermine the Constitution.  See M’Culloch, 4 Wheat at 423.  Eugene Gressman makes this
point clear, 
Because the clause justifies only those laws that carry into execution some other
vested object, it necessarily prohibits those that are mere subterfuges or pretexts for
executing an end not entrusted to Congress or any other organ of government.
There is no legitimate power residing in Congress to thwart or undo the
enforcement of prevailing constitutional doctrines, developed by the Supreme Court.
Under the constitutional scheme, that is a power reserved for the Court itself, absent a
constitutional amendment. 
In effect, destroying lower- court jurisdiction is simply a step toward the larger
objective of destroying the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over these matters,
which in turn is the final step toward the destruction of prevailing constitutional doctrines
regarding school prayer and Bible reading. Such an objective, from the first step to the
last, is quite impermissible under the ends-means test.
Eugene Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 495, 514 (1983). 
204 See H.R. 2547 § 2.
205 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
206 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
40
purpose of erasing the judiciary’s interpretation of the Constitution.  Such a result violates the
separation of powers doctrine and thus make the legislation unconstitutional under McCulloch v.
Maryland.203  Under the RFRA II, the drafters make it exceedingly clear that their intent is to
undermine the judiciary.204  In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court made it clear that Congress
was not free to legislate on the interpretation of constitutional provisions that the Court had
already ruled upon.205  Under the Constitution, the judiciary has the authority to interpret the
constitution in order to decide cases and controversies.206 By removing jurisdiction from the
207 See M’Culloch, 4 Wheat at 421-23.
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federal courts, the RFRA II would have the impermissible purpose of treading on the Court’s
power to adjudicate such cases and controversies.  Where Congress explicitly attempts to remove
jurisdiction from the courts to undermine Supreme Court precedent, it removes the power of that
court to interpret the constitution and decide cases, both in the first instance and through
application of its precedent.  As such, Congress is not free to act, either directly or indirectly to
overturn the precedent of the Supreme Court on matters of constitutional interpretation.
Finally, under the RFRA II, Congress fails to recognize the countervailing rights of
citizens, recognized in the Supreme Court’s precedent, to be free from governmental
establishment of religion and to be free from coerced religious pressures.  As will be discussed
more fully below, the RFRA II may violate the constitutional prohibition of governmental
establishment of religion.  It would appear that the drafters of the RFRA II ignore the
Establishment Clause and free exercise rights recognized by the Supreme Court precedent they
attempt to overturn.  The effect of the legislation, then would be to infringe on other
constitutional rights.  Such an effect would be in violation of the Constitution, and thus, under
McCulloch, would prohibit Congress from acting pursuant to its Article III, section 2
authority.207 Any time Congress legislates, it must act consistently with the other provisions of
the Constitution.  The RFRA II implicates separation of powers concerns, due process concerns,
and Establishment Clause concerns.  Thus RFRA II, if enacted, should be overturned as an
unconstitutional application of Congress’s powers under either Article III, section 2 or Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
208  465 U.S. 668.
209 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. (“The effects prong [of Lemon] asks whether, irrespective of
government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval” to an objective observer.  Id.)
210 See, e.g., Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263-64.
211 See Id.
212 See Id.
213 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
214 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 263-64.
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C. RFRA II is an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
In Lynch v. Donnely208, Justice O’Conner, in a concurring opinion, set forth the terms of
the endorsement test209.  Since then, the endorsement test has been used to determine whether a
law has the impermissible effect of advancing or encouraging religion.210  The test has been
applied on its own, and as a means of determining whether the effects prong of the Lemon test
has been violated.  In Cutter, the Sixth Circuit gave the endorsement test the latter treatment.211 
In that case, the Court held that the RLUIPA was an unconstitutional establishment of religion.212 
The Court applied the Lemon test, which requires government action to have a legitimate secular
purpose, the effects of which will neither advance or discourage religion, and which does not
result in excessive government entanglement of religion.213  In Cutter, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the statute had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion because, according
to the court, it gave preferential treatment to those who chose to practice a religion.214  
The RFRA II must fail for the same reasons.  Under the proposed statute, the drafters
discriminate against both non-believers and minority religions.  By preventing federal courts
from hearing questions related to school prayer and Ten Commandment displays, the drafters
215 The drafters of RFRA II intend for such disputes to be heard by state courts, who are
more susceptible to political pressure and thus more likely to follow the will of the people.  See
Lawrence Gene Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 68-69.  Sager characterized this
interaction as “if Congress were casting a lewd wink in the state court’s direction.”  Id. at 41.
216 See, e.g. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681, note 6.  But see, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (Supreme Court held state statute unconstitutional under the purpose prong of Lemon. 
The Court did note that generally courts should give deference to the stated legislative purpose
of the state.).
217 Such a result also implicates due process concerns.  See Sager, supra note 215 at 70.
(“To the extent that local officials interfere with the exercise of rights, those claiming the rights
may require judicial assistance; if constitutional claimants are deprived of timely and effective
judicial relief, the exercise of their right is burdened.”  Id. at 70.
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hope that precedent finding those practices unconstitutional will be overturned or ignored by
state and local governments.215  In essence, the drafter’s purpose in proposing the legislation is to
promote Christianity by allowing school prayer and public displays of the Ten Commandments. 
The drafters could argue that their purpose is to protect individual religious liberties.  Since
Courts generally do not question the congressional purpose of a statute where there is at least
some indication of a secular legislative purpose, it is likely that despite the real purpose of the
RFRA II, the courts would likely not overturn it on the purpose prong of the Lemon test.216
However, when examining the effects prong under the endorsement test, as the court in
Cutter did, it is obvious that a reasonable observer, knowing the full history of the government
action, would find the proposed act to be an endorsement of religion.  It is clearly intended to
make certain religious individuals appear to be political insiders, while shutting minority and
anti-religious people out of the political process.  The endorsement is most pernicious here
because the drafters intend to shut those people, currently protected under the Supreme Court’s
prior cases, out of the judicial process completely.217  Under the RFRA II, a school could engage
218 See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265-66.  The RFRA II states, “Over the past five decades,
rulings of the United States Supreme Court have served to infringe upon the rights of Americans
to enjoy freedom of speech relating to religious matters.”  H.R. 1547 § 2 (4).
219 And in so doing, implicate due process concerns.  See supra note 217.
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in teacher-led school prayer, without regard to the effects such prayer would have on members of
minority religions and those who do not accept religion at all.  Where prior Supreme Court
precedent respected the rights of these individuals to be free from proselytizing in the public
schools, the proposed Act would remove protection from these individuals, and even worse,
would remove from them a neutral forum for the enforcement of their rights.  Clearly, such a
result would have the impermissible effect of endorsing religion, and would thus be
unconstitutional.  
Further, like the Sixth Circuit in Cutter pointed out under the RLUIPA, RFRA II attempts
only to protect free speech rights as they relate to religious speech.218  The proposed statute
would give additional protections to those individuals attempting to vindicate religious speech
rights.  The bill would remove the court’s jurisdiction only in cases related to “religious-
freedom.”  The discrimination is two-fold.  For religious minorities, they lose a forum in which
to address their constitutional grievances whereas those individuals who feel that their state and
local governments are infringing on other fundamental constitutional rights would still have
access to the federal courts to challenge such acts.  In other words, the RFRA II would treat the
religious liberty rights of religious minorities and non-believers as subordinate to other
fundamental constitutional rights.219  Second, given the congressional findings articulated in the
bill, it is clear that the drafters intend for state and local governments to enact legislation or
policies that would allow prayer in school and public displays of the Ten Commandments. 
220 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
45
Under current precedent, such state action is unconstitutional because it has the impermissible
effect of encouraging and supporting religion.  By removing the important federal check on a
state’s power to legislate with respect to religion, the denial of jurisdiction to the federal courts
acts, for all practical effects, to overturn the Supreme Court’s precedent, and allow, and in fact
encourage, states to support and encourage religion.  For all the reasons articulated in the
Supreme Court’s school prayer and public displays of religious symbols cases, such a result
violates the establishment clause.  Thus, The RFRA II acts to discriminate against religious
minorities and non-believers by providing unfavorable treatment to the enforcement of religious
liberty rights as opposed to other fundamental rights; and by encouraging state and local
governments to enact laws and policies that the Supreme Court has previously determined to be
unconstitutional violations of the Establishment Clause without fear of reversal by the federal
courts.   The RFRA II is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
D. Apparently Congress Hasn’t Learned its Lesson
A core fundamental principle undergirding our legal system is the concept of separation
of powers.  Every elementary student learns about the tripartite system of government and the
important system of checks and balances that such a system requires.  The Constitution itself
embodies this notion of separation of powers by granting each branch of government specific
duties and powers.  The Judicial branch was charged with hearing cases and controversies
arising under the Constitution.220  It is true that Article III grants Congress the authority to
221 See generally Gressman, supra note 51, Sager, supra note 217.
222 States have no federal obligation to maintain a court that hears federal constitutional
questions, even though in practical effect, if Congress limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction the
state courts would hear the case.
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remove or restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but surely the framers did not intend for
Congress to use its power to overturn the Supreme Court.  If that were the case, as Justice
Marshall observed in M’Culloch, Congress would have the authority to re-write the Constitution
based upon the fickle whim of the legislature - a result that would make moot the arduous
amendment process detailed in the Constitution.  Further, such a reading would make the
creation of the Supreme Court seem trivial.  If Congress can limit the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court
would have only its original jurisdiction (which only covers a few types of disputes) and the
cases and controversies clause, granting the courts the authority to hear cases arising under the
Constitution would be mere surplusage.221
If such a result were intended, Congress would be the supreme arbiter of the Constitution,
for if Congress so chose, it could deny the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction and the federal
courts original jurisdiction to hear any case arising under the Constitution.222  At that point,
Congress could pass laws “interpreting” the Constitution - and in fact even amending it, and the
courts, despite Justice Marshall’s conclusion in Marbury that there is judicial review of
congressional acts, would have no authority to intervene.  Such a result is ludicrous, and flies in
the face of any true notion of separation of powers.  
Justice Marshall, in M’Culloch got it right.  Congress cannot act when such an act would
violate other constitutional principles.  Separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional
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principle.  Regardless of its methods, Congress cannot, consistent with the separation of powers
principles, enact legislation overturning, or intending to overturn, the Supreme Court.
IV. Conclusion
By dramatically changing the landscape of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith set off a battle of the branches that is still being
waged.  In response to the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress enacted the RFRA, the purpose of
which was, essentially, to overturn the Court’s decision in Smith.  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court held that the RFRA, as it applied to the states, was an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional authority.  In its decision, the Court chastised Congress for violating the principle
of the separation of powers which is a foundational principle of constitutional law.  In response,
Congress enacted subsequent legislation, the RLUIPA, to achieve a purpose similar to the
RFRA, but to avoid the constitutional problems that led to RFRA’s demise.  Serious questions
related to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the separation of powers, and the Establishment
Clause were raised as states challenged the constitutionality of the RLUIPA.  Thus far, only one
circuit court has held the RLUIPA unconstitutional, and that was on Establishment Clause
grounds.  In 2003, legislation was proposed in both the House of Representatives and Senate,
along the same lines as the RFRA and the RLUIPA, intending to overturn Supreme Court
precedent as it relates to school prayer and religious display cases.  Based on the historic
concepts of the separation of powers as addressed in Marbury and McCulloch and the
Establishment Clause under the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, the RLPA II, if enacted,
will likely be found unconstitutional.  
These three pieces of legislation all illustrate a congressional attempt to usurp power
48
from the judiciary.  For various reasons, it has been shown that each piece of legislation is likely
unconstitutional.  Paramount, however, is the notion that Congress does not have the authority,
regardless of its methods, to circumvent the Supreme Court.
